Peter Bowbrick

It is glaringly obvious in any famine that people who have money or other ways to get food survive, while others do not, and that some groups who were previously adequately fed suffer disproportionately. The English classical economists, from Adam Smith, recognized this and said that famines should be tackled by creating effective demand. Government should give the poor food, money and work. In England and Ireland the Poor Law system would handle this. The increased demand would create the incentive for the private sector to import, so Government need not intervene on the supply side.

It was found in the Irish Famine and in a string of Indian famines that the demand side approach alone did not work: the private sector did not bring in sufficient food, nor did they import it in time. Accordingly, by the beginning of this century a two pronged approach was normal. Government should ensure that there was enough food to go round, by supply side measures, especially imports. At the same time, it should create effective demand in the old way, by issuing free food, by food for work, etc.

Sen reintroduced the classical approach under the name "the entitlement approach" (1976, 1977, 1980, 1980b, 1981, 1981 b, 1984). This is now seen to be the dominant and correct approach in reviews by Devereux (1993) and Ravallion (1997). Like the classical economists the entitlement theorists concentrate almost entirely on the demand side, though they do not present it in any greater breadth or depth than for example Hunter (1873), Frere (1874) and Mahalanobis, Mukkerjee, and Ghosh (1946), nor do the prescriptions go much further than the Bengal Famine Code (1897).

The entitlement theorists have given particular emphasis to one part of the old theory: they assert that most famines occur when there is no sudden decline in total food availability. For example, a boom or inflation may mean that some people eat a lot more food than before, so there is not enough to go round for the others and some die. Wherever this is true, it is formally unnecessary for government to import food: redistribution is all that is needed, and the Classical approach will suffice. In all famines some people continue to eat well, and the starving may be excused for thinking that they were starving because the rich were eating more than usual. In the Central European hyperinflations of the 1920s and 1930s people were seen to die because they did not have the cash to buy food, so the inflation theory of famine became popular. This influenced the Government of Bengal in 1943 when they chose to believe that inflation and speculation, rather than a cyclone, caused the famine. The theory appeared sporadically in textbooks, but was introduced to the wider economic literature by Sen. Similarly, the possibility that speculation often caused famines was always popular, though dismissed by Adam Smith, but was introduced to the wider economic literature by Sen (I have shown elsewhere that this is theoretically impossible in the sort of economies for which it is postulated).

The entitlement school asserts its difference by saying that its predecessors adopted the Food Availability Decline (FAD) approach, and then making a violent attack on the FAD approach (e.g. Sen, Devereux). The FAD approach is nowhere defined, and Sen uses FAD in many senses, but I think that it would be fair to say it was an approach which states that all famines are caused by declines in absolute availability (not in availability per head) and which ignores the demand side. This approach does not appear in the literature, and is wholly mythical. The entitlement theorists are so eager to distance themselves from the mythical FAD approach that they tend to avoid looking at availability at all - indeed Sen is highly critical of the Bengal Government because they wanted to determine the degree of shortage while a famine was raging. Because they ignore the supply side, they do not distinguish between the uneven impact of shortages on different groups, a result which is seen in any famine however caused, and the possibility that the uneven impact could be a cause of famine. It is illogical to argue that because there was an uneven impact, this uneven impact caused the famine. This is not even the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy, as the supposed cause occurs at the same time as the result.

The entitlement approach is based very largely if not entirely on Sen's and others analysis of five famines, in which, it is asserted, speculation and redistribution (e.g. boom famine) were the causes. The factual base of these analyses has been widely challenged. Sen's data has been criticized in some detail by Goswami (1990), T. Dyson and A. Maharatna (1991), T. Dyson (1991, 1996), Basu (1984, 1986), Kumar (1990). Dyson concludes A. . while they are far from being complete explanations, FADS were probably involved in all five of Sen's famines." Dyson, T. (1996). Bowbrick (1986, 1998), examines Sen's paradigm case, the Bengal Famine of 1943, and argues that his facts are in conflict with those in his sources. Seaman and Holt (1980) while not mentioning Sen, explode one of his cases: AIn the Ethiopian case dealt with in this paper, the inevitability of a massive food shortage in the Wollo Province was known to the Imperial Ethiopian Government from a detailed qualitative crop survey completed in November 1972. The government was reluctant to declare an emergency until March 1973. But when international relief was called forward in April, it took until November for bulk food shipments to begin to arrive."

Since the theory lacks a factual basis, and its theoretical approach to speculation has been shown to be wanting, this paper examines its other theoretical aspect, that a famine can be caused by a change in the distribution of supply, rather than a fall in supply per head. It asks whether it is possible, even in theory, for a major famine, as opposed to isolated areas of distress and hunger, to be caused by a boom, as Sen, Devereux, Ravallion, etc argue, and, if so, under what conditions.

Initially may examine an economy very similar to those analysed by Sen. We take an economy where 90% of the population are agricultural producers. The remaining 10% of the population are urban, and all non-agricultural production is done in urban areas. There is a single urban area. Initially it will be assumed that there is no immigration or emigration, and that there are no imports or exports of food.

In a year in which there are 100x tonnes of food eaten, there is just enough food to go round, with no rationing and no starvation. Everybody gets enough to eat according to social norms, which does not imply that there is no malnutrition. It is assumed that nobody gets less than the minimum survival amount of food or, alternatively, that it is socially acceptable that a certain proportion of the population, say 5%, is slowly starving, and that as long as this level remains constant, there will be no outcry. This amount of food may be termed "the minimum-no-shortage supply of food".

It will be taken here that if the supply of food is between 90x tonnes of food and 100x tonnes of food, there is a First Degree Shortage, where there is sufficient food to provide a barely adequate diet for everyone, provided that there is rationing. If there is no rationing, some sections of the population will suffer from serious malnutrition or starvation. If there is 80x to 90x tonnes, there is a Second Degree Shortage - there is insufficient food for long-term survival, but rationing would keep most of the population alive, though suffering from deficiency diseases, until the next harvest. If there is less than 80x tonnes, there is a Third Degree Shortage - there is insufficient food for long term survival. If everyone were given a bare survival ration, food would run out before the next harvest. Mass starvation is inevitable without imports. These definitions of shortage are related to the nutrition of the population, and have no relation to market conditions.

The question to be asked is whether in a year in which there is 10% more food than this, 110x tonnes, a famine can be caused by boom conditions. For the event to be classed as a famine, it will be required that at least half of the population goes short of food, with half of these going so seriously short of food that their survival is at risk, and with at least 2% of the total dying. More serious famines than this have been blamed on booms. It is trivial to say that a small part of the population may be badly affected by the economic changes that take place in a boom, or that there may be a few more or less deaths by starvation as a result of changes in the economic status of some occupational groups.

This means that the impact of the boom will depend on the number of people whose finances improve and the amount of extra food that each eats.

For the boom to cause a famine, therefore, it must cause some sections of the urban population to eat so much more food that the remaining population goes short. If the urban population ate twice as much as usual, 20x tonnes instead of the minimum-no-shortage amount of 10x, there would be a minimum no shortage supply of 90x tonnes for the rural population. If they ate up to three times as much, 30x tonnes, there would be a First Degree Shortage, in which, in principle, increased mortality could be prevented by seizing traders' stocks and distributing them by rationing and handouts. If they ate up to four times as much, 40x tonnes, there would be a Second Degree Shortage for the rural population, and only if they ate more than this would there be a Third Degree Shortage, with major starvation inevitable. This calculation is based on the assumption that the Third Degree Shortage situation has an average calorie consumption of less than 77% of the minimum no shortage level.

In fact, the richest countries consume about 3600 calories per head per day, when there is no financial constraint on the number of calories consumed, and there is an inexhaustible supply of junk food and alcohol which provide calories without bulk. This is about 60-70% more than the minimum-no-shortage consumption of the type of country we are considering. It is unlikely that any boom will bring a significant proportion of the population to the stage where money is not a constraint to calorie consumption. Nor is it likely that people can physically consume the quantity of rice, cassava etc. to produce an average calorie consumption of 3600.

So far, the discussion has been in terms of averages, but there may be large inequalities in food consumption. In this economy it is assumed that only 20% of the population is very poor with barely sufficient to eat.

It is not necessary to model the situation where a small number of people have jobs in war industries, say, and they and their dependants increase their consumption to the extent that there is a famine. For 2 % of the population to have this effect, they would have to eat 60 times the normal amount, which is absurd.

Instead, I shall model some scenarios where the boom benefits more of the urban population. Generally, those who are already well fed are most likely to benefit from the boom. They will not want to increase their calorie consumption. Those who are already at average income levels will want to increase their calorie consumption but not by much. Manual workers may eat more calories than the middle classes do. Any of the very poor 20% who get jobs will want to increase their calorie consumption significantly. It is assumed that the urban population consists of 10% of the total population, made up of 2% who eat no more calories, 6% eating some more calories, 1% eating a great deal more calories, and 1% not benefiting at all.

Two scenarios are presented in Tables 1 and 2. These compare the situation in the initial minimum no-shortage year, in a year when supplies are 10% higher than this, but there is no boom, and in a year when supplies are 10% higher but there is a boom. Scenario 1 has calorie consumption barely within the bounds of possibility and shows that consumption in the urban area might be 18% more in a boom year than in a non-boom year and 27% more than in the initial minimum no shortage year. The effect of this on supply for the rest of the population would be negligible, a reduction of 2% compared with a non-boom year. This amount is 8% more than in the initial minimum no-shortage year, and 18% more than a Second Degree Shortage supply level where famine can be expected.

Table 2 has the situation where the urban population, except some of the poorest, go on an eating binge, and eat 6000 calories per head per day, which is absurd. The result of this gluttony is that they eat more than twice as much food as in a non-boom year, and 2.24 times as much as in the initial minimum-no-shortage year. Even so, the total consumption in the rural area falls by only 11% compared with a non-boom year. The consumption is only 2% lower than the initial minimum no-shortage situation. There could be some distress, some increase in mortality rates, or government could introduce some form of rationing. Nothing like a famine would be observed.

Scenario 3 has a situation where the urban population is half of the total. There is a substantial increase in urban consumption as a result of the boom, 13.7% more than the non-boom situation. Rural consumption falls by 13% compared with a non-boom year, but only by 1.1% compared with the initial minimum-no-shortage year. Again, there will be no famine.

Of course, it is possible to dream up a scenario where a few occupational groups bear the full brunt of any fall of food supply in rural areas. This scenario would result in some people starving, while the rest of the rural sector does rather well for itself. However, we are then talking of a very small number of people starving, not the widespread famine that a boom is said to be capable of causing.

This section has shown that it is extremely difficult to create a realistic scenario under which a boom will cause a famine. Neither the assumption that all the urban population gorge themselves with food, nor the assumption that there is a very large urban population benefiting from the boom is sufficient.

a situation may be examined where consumption per head was uniform before the boom. In this case there is no First Degree Shortage situation, because rationing cannot improve distribution - either there is no shortage or there is a Second Degree Shortage.

If, as a result of the boom, the 10% urban population eat twice as much as usual, which is absurd, there will be 90x tonnes left for the remainder, which is the initial minimum-no-shortage level. If consumption is any more than this, there will be a Second Degree Shortage. Because of the uniformity of distribution small shortages will manifest themselves as general hunger and a higher than normal mortality rather than as outbreaks of famine or the deaths of particular occupation groups.

Such an economy is certainly more at risk than one with unequal distribution of consumption, but this is mainly because the average consumption level assumed is lower at the initial minimum-no-shortage level. The risk is because there are smaller amounts of food, and there is no improvement possible through rationing.

The scenarios presented above are dependent on the assumption that 90% of the urban population benefit from the boom. One would normally expect that the army, police, civil service, local government officials, teachers, school children, prisoners, and hospital patients and most employees would not benefit at all from a boom, and indeed would be left behind by inflation. Other occupational groups would benefit indirectly, and with lags, if at all. It is quite likely that less than a third of the population benefits. This means that, where Scenario 2 for instance has the urban population more than doubling its consumption, the small proportion of the population benefiting directly would have to eat more than six times the normal amount of food, which is absurd.

It should be noted that the prices recorded in a famine might be from four to 20 times as high as normal prices. The implication is that people make so much money from the boom that not only do they eat many times more food but they pay many times as much. If the urban population only doubles its food consumption, it is spending from eight to sixty times as much on food, which is absurd.

Discussions on famine tend to concentrate on grain, because statistics exist, and because famine relief tends to be grain. We may instead consider two classes of goods, inferior goods, including grain, potatoes, cassava, onions, palm oil or mustard oil and superior goods including meat, sugar, fats, fruit, vegetables and perhaps alcohol. It is significant that many of the inferior goods are produced by subsistence farmers or small farmers, and are harvested once a year. Many of the other foods are produced through the year. Some are processed or produced on estates, so the farmer has no control over final sale. It is also significant that it is possible to increase marketed supply of some superior foods in the short run between grain harvests: short-season vegetables and meat in particular. If the prices are high enough, meat and dairy animals, and even draught animals, will be sold off.

The middle classes may respond to a higher real income by switching to superior foods. To some extent they will have done this already. It may be that they would, if allowed, switch to imported luxury items, though it has been assumed here that there are no imports. They will not increase their calorie consumption.

The working class and the lower middle class may respond to a higher real income partly by increasing their calorie intake and partly by switching to more expensive foods. They may do this by reducing their intake of inferior foods. Most urban workers need fewer calories than manual workers or farmers.

The poor will respond to higher real income by increasing their calorie intake.

The implication is that an increase in the spending power of the urban population will be felt largely as an increase in demand for superior foods. There may be a reduction in the amount of grain and other inferior food bought in urban areas. What happens then is that more of the superior foods are sold in the city, and less in the country. Prices are high, and with meat, fruit and vegetables, the high prices are received by the producers. Other superior goods such as canned and processed foods are sold in the city.

Since there is less inferior food sold in the city, there will be more sold in rural areas. Since rural workers do not benefit from the boom, they are not in a position to bid up the price of grain at the margin (though I suggest that some producers of superior goods will benefit).

Let us consider the situation where the boom causes the urban population to double from 10 million to 20 million. This means that industrial output more than doubles. The new workers are all going into industry, not administration etc., and they do not bring many dependants in the short run. The doubling of output takes place in a few months. Such booms are rare indeed.

If the workers and their dependants come from another country, their consumption is in addition to existing consumption. In principle, though, if food availability is 10% above the original minimum-no-shortage level, and the population is 10% higher, the country will be somewhere around the initial minimum-no-shortage level. Some rationing and special procurement may be necessary to avoid a First Degree Shortage. However, the food supply is still 10% higher than the Second Degree Shortage level, and starvation can be prevented by rationing and handouts. There may be pockets of distress, but nothing like a famine.

If the ten million workers and dependants come from the rural area, then there is no change in the number of mouths to feed. Manual workers moving to industrial jobs may actually reduce calorie consumption. By definition, there is 10% more food available than the initial minimum-no-shortage level, and 20% more than the Second Degree Shortage level. The long term effects of removing the workers from agriculture may be to reduce production, but the definitions exclude consideration of this situation.

a medium to a long-term switch in the relative purchasing power of town and country frequently throws up food problems, and structural adjustment can make an economy much more prone to famine especially in the early years. These cannot be called boom famines.

The concept of a boom famine requires an extremely rapid build up of demand, while output and imports remain constant.

The marketing system has to procure four times the normal amount of food, transport it and store it. How is the food procured?

Timing is of key importance here. For example, the onset of the boom may have been

1. very sudden, at harvest time.

2. very sudden, six months after harvest

3. fast, over a six month period, starting at harvest time

4. fast, over a six month period, starting six months from harvest.

5. over a one-year period, starting at harvest time

6. over a one-year period, starting six months after harvest

One possibility is that the wholesalers and distributors might procure the whole quantity required - four times the usual amount - for the urban areas immediately after harvest in the normal way. The difference is that the quantity that will have to be bought, transported out of the production area and stored is several times higher than in non-boom years.

In a companion paper to this (Can Speculators cause Famines?), I examine the quantities that speculators would have to buy to cause the famine (on the assumption that the surplus is to be exported, destroyed or kept in store, rather than being eaten by the workers benefiting from the boom). It is physically and financially difficult to manage such large purchases, and the transport and the storage space for them is not likely to exist.

As with speculation, it is unlikely to be practically possible to procure, store and distribute so much grain, and it would be irrational for speculators or wholesalers to attempt to do so.

It is difficult to imagine speculators buying four times the normal amount of grain at harvest, and paying a price well above the normal price for it. The payoff envisaged is that they will be able to sell all this grain to the urban sector, and that they will be able to charge famine prices for it. They have absolutely no evidence that such a situation ever existed in the past. They also know that a lot of the grain will have to go cheaply to the army, police, civil servants and politicians.

If the wholesalers believe that the urban demand will suddenly be much higher, but the sellers do not (and the sellers will include landlords who cannot be assumed to be innocents), they will have to pay prices above the normal procurement prices, but below famine prices, to obtain this quantity. They will be buying more than three times the normal amount, at, say, 1.5 to 2.5 times the normal price. If their guess is wrong, and urban demand is not higher, they will certainly be bankrupted. Even if they were to guess right, government would probably take action which would bring the price down: it might seize stocks, impose rationing, import, or all three. The risk of bankruptcy is so high that it would be irrational to make this decision.

If both the buyers and sellers know that the urban demand is this much higher, prices will be at the famine level from the beginning of the season. Wholesalers have to lay out even higher sums of money, with little prospect of making big profits even if the demand is as they expect: large quantities will still have to be supplied to the public sector at a relatively low price. Again, a collapse in urban demand would bankrupt them, as would imports, rationing or the seizure of stocks.

It would be irrational for wholesalers to take these risks when very few famines are even claimed to be boom famines, and there has been no discussion even by economists of why the famine effects of booms arise suddenly then vanish as suddenly, in the middle of a long boom period.

The alternative, where the extra consumption is not bought immediately after harvest, requires the odd situation that city dwellers eat say three times the normal amount of food until the purchased stocks are vanishing, then traders go back to the country to buy more. Procurement prices will rise very rapidly until farmers are receiving famine prices. The assumption is that the agricultural sector continues to sell even when they themselves are facing starvation. I have set out some scenarios, such as deficit producers giving their crop as rent to landlords who then sell to the city, where this may be possible.

In a situation where all agricultural producers produce a surplus after paying costs and rent, a rural famine will not occur. Farmers have produced 10% more than normal, and may choose to consume some or all of the extra production. If they choose to sell it all, so that urban areas have twice the initial minimum no shortage supply, then the marginal farmers have enough for survival, and others have more than this level.

If prices paid by city dwellers were sufficiently high, then those farmers who produced more than they needed for bare subsistence would be tempted to sell their surplus. If every farmer did so, there would be adequate food for all the rural population, and no starvation or excess mortality. The amount that would be released in this way depends on the inequality of distribution in normal years. In Scenario 1, Table 1, the surplus of the rural sector would increase to 16% if the rural sector reduced the consumption of middle classes and average producers to 2500 calories. That is to say the urban population can eat nearly three times as much without causing starvation or excess mortality in the rural sector.

If the urban sector wants more than this, the producers will refuse to sell. Unless there is forceable procurement at the point of a bayonet, there will be no famine.

At the other extreme, we may take the position where all farmers are in deficit after paying costs and rent. They end up with less than 75% of the food they produce. In normal years they earn enough from casual labour and so on to bring them up to survival level.

Here there will be a famine in any year that the landlords do not give the farmers back sufficient to survive on, by way of wages, loans, etc. This would happen if they sold all their stocks to the city, ignoring their social and tribal obligations to retain grain for their people.

The position may be significantly worse when there is a uniform distribution of consumption in the rural area, with consumption near the bare subsistence level.

Inflation does not necessarily imply a boom, often the contrary. It is a commonplace that inflation can cause serious production problems and even famine in agricultures dependant on purchased inputs, but this is not the boom famine situation where changed consumption patterns cause famine.

Inflation does not mean that all prices of all goods rise equally. In the rural areas there is an influx of money just after harvest, and from that period to the next harvest there may be no inflow of money. In a near-subsistence economy where farmers do not buy much from the urban sector, much of the revenue from the crop is spent immediately after harvest, before inflation has eroded its spending power. Within the sector the price of labour and food is set by supply and demand.

The price of grain is set by supply and demand. Once the urban population have eaten their fill, the rest will be sold to rural producers, and the price will be set by supply and demand. The price is not set by the price that urban workers are willing to pay, any more than the British price of bread is set by the price that millionaires are willing to pay.

In many boom situations, the increased earnings will be spent on consumer goods and imported luxury foods rather than on increased food consumption. Wartime blockades produce the most likely exceptions,

If imports are possible, one must ask why traders or government would not import at normal prices, rather than paying high prices, famine prices even, for food. If they do import, there can be no famine. In most situations today donors would finance imports if necessary.

This model has assumed away some of the buffers against famine. It is normal for the grain trade to carry over stocks of perhaps one or two months' supply from one year to another. This means that in an emergency, supplies within a year can be increased by reducing stocks, effectively borrowing from the next year's supplies. Similarly, cassava crops can be harvested after only one or two years growth, rather than waiting four years for the maximum yield, so increasing supply in the current year at the expense of future years. It is possible to eat the maize crop as green maize rather than waiting until the grain is ripe. If these buffers were allowed for in the model, the amount of increased consumption necessary to cause the famine is much higher.

Another set of buffers is the grain used for animal feed, manufacturing and brewing. This can be diverted to human consumption, and will certainly be diverted if famine prices can be obtained for it.

Only in wartime or with a blockade, and in a zero stock situation, can supplies within a year be taken as fixed.

The weakness of the boom famine hypothesis is confirmed by the fact that many inflations occur without famines and many famines occur without booms, and there is no theory to explain why. It is not just that the examples sometimes produced are disputed. It is that many countries with very similar economies to those where the boom famines are supposed to have occurred had high inflation and even hyper inflation without causing famines, even when there was a very fragile food situation prior to the hyper inflation. Rather fewer of these economies have had an economic boom, but the question remains: why was there no famine?

If we examine the entitlement theorists' paradigm example of the Bengal famine of 1943 the questions become particularly pressing. No theory has been put forward to explain

• why a boom famine should have occurred in Bengal in 1943 but not in other years. In every year from 1939 to 1945 at least there was rapid inflation, a boom in war industries, (small) migration to the cities, hoarding and speculation. 1943 was no different in these respects. And of course it was the same Bengal with the same social and economic structure in each of these years.
• why a famine, described as a boom famine, should hit so suddenly, in a matter of three months. This implies an enormous and very rapid boom.
• why the famine should have started in exactly the months that it would have started if it had been caused by a crop failure. Coincidence, or wrong diagnosis?
• why the famine should have stopped when the next main rice crop was harvested. The wartime boom continued unabated, and the purchasing power of the urban workers was relatively much greater than before, as the rural population was destitute after the famine.
• why the evidence is that consumption in the urban areas was lower than in previous years, not higher.
• why the evidence is that less grain was shipped from the country to the urban areas than from the urban areas to the country (imported grain)

If, however, one accepts the overwhelming evidence that the Bengal rice crop of December 1942 was 30% below normal, an amount equivalent to 25% of the marketed surplus of India as a whole (See Famine Inquiry Commission 1945 a, b, Goswami 1990) these facts are explained.

The strength of a theory relies on what it forbids (Popper, 1963). a theory that says that some circumstances may exist where a boom could cause a famine is of little interest. It is not testable, because a great many booms do not cause a famine. One that states that a boom will certainly cause a famine if certain conditions exist, but not otherwise, is of some interest and may be testable.

It has been shown that the hypothesis of a boom famine cannot be supported in the types of economy in which it could be expected to occur. It requires that the people benefiting from the boom eat at least three times as much as in the initial-no-shortage year, which is absurd. It requires that they spend eight to sixty times as much on food, which is absurd.

The procurement of this quantity of food meets transport, storage and financing constraints. It would be irrational for wholesalers to make an investment many times greater than their normal outlay, on the off chance that the boom makes the urban people eat many times as much as usual, and that they will continue to eat at this rate until all the wholesalers' purchases can be disposed of. It would be irrational for them to risk so much on the assumption that government will not intervene with imports, rationing or the seizure of stocks.

The main novel component of the entitlement approach is seen to be theoretically wrong, which is not surprising as its factual basis has been widely challenged. What remains is the English classical approach, which has proved so disastrous in practice.

Policy should never be influenced by the policy that food scarcities might be caused by a boom famine, since it is certain that no boom famine can occur in the type of economy for which it is normally postulated, and it is extremely unlikely that there will be a boom economy in any other economy. This is of practical importance, since an administrator who believes in the boom famine hypothesis might act decisively in a famine situation, seizing traders' stocks, imposing rationing and, perhaps, importing a little food. This would be effective if there was just a First Degree Shortage, or No Shortage. However, if there was a Second Degree or Third Degree Shortage, the results would be disastrous. Substantial imports - much larger than those that might be appropriate for a boom famine - are needed to prevent widespread starvation. The wrong theory can kill millions.

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